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The
Reply

Brief

plaintiff/appellant,
pursuant to Rule

Gary

Hunt,

submits

this

24(c) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
There is one issue on appeal in this case: Are there
material issues of fact regarding whether ESI designed the
transfer conveyor which injured Gary Hunt?

Within that main

issue are three subissues: 1) whether there was a design defect
in the transfer conveyor initially designed by ESI; 2) whether
there was a substantial alteration in that design; and 3)
regardless of any substantial alteration, whether the original
design defect was a proximate case of Hunt's injury.
ESI argues that, of those three subissues, only the
proximate cause issue was raised by Hunt in the trial court.
ESI is wrong.

The basis of the plaintiff's entire claim

against ESI is that the transfer conveyor was negligently
designed by ESI for, among other things, failing to have tail
pulley guards.

(R. 74, 779). That issue is preserved.

Hunt

also raised this design defect in his Memorandum in Opposition
to ESI Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 267-268, 271).

The main thrust of ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the design issue was that ESI wasn't responsible for Hunt's
1

injury

because

ESI's design was altered

in 1985 when the

transfer conveyor was changed from an open web steel joist
frame to a channel iron frame.

(R. 593, 596, 606-607) .

Hunt

argued in his Memorandum in Opposition to ESI's Motion for
Summary Judgment that regardless of the change in the frame,
the tail pulley should have held a guard.

(R. 267) .

Each of the issues presented on appeal was raised in
the trial court and is properly before this Court.
POINT II
ESI next

argues that Hunt presented

insufficient

evidence that the conveyor which hurt Hunt was designed by ESI
and constructed according to ESI's design.

The trial court's

Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 6 (R. 774), coupled with Conclusion
of Law No. 12 (R. 762) are sufficient to raise questions of
fact

regarding

those

issues

which

require

remand.

Hunt

produced significantly more evidence than that of ESI's design
and how it was followed.
The cases cited by Hunt in his initial appeal brief
are applicable to this appeal.

On the issues relied upon,

there is no distinction between a negligent design claim or a
strict products liability defective design claim.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
(Replying to Respondent's Point I)
ALL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL WERE RAISED
IN THE TRIAL COURT
In the Statement of Facts section of its Brief, ESI
presents argument that needs response.

ESI seems to argue that

Hunt should be limited in his presentation of issues on appeal
because of limited objections to the trial court's finding of
facts and conclusions of law.

ESI then lists finding of fact

after finding of fact to which Hunt did not formally object.
In the trial court, Hunt did object to the entire
excessive and unnecessary findings of fact submitted by ESI.
(R. 669-670).
granting

of

Findings of fact are unnecessary to support the
summary

judgment.

Mountain

Wright, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

States v. Atkin,

All that is required under

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that the
trial court issue a brief written statement of the grounds of
its

decision.

Hunt

did

object,

specifically

or

in

his

opposition to ESI's summary judgment motion, to every finding
of fact and conclusion of law necessary to preserve these
issues on appeal.

Hunt's written memorandum in opposition to

ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment preserves his objection to
the only issue relevant to this appeal: the trial court's
3

conclusion of law that "the plaintiff was not injured by the
transfer conveyor designed by ESI."

(R. 766).

Also in the Statement of Facts section of its Brief,
ESI

claims

that

the

"tracking"

of the transfer

conveyor,

allegedly caused by a bent frame, and not the design of the
conveyor, was the cause of Hunt's injury. First, it is disputed
whether Hunt was taking action to correct excessive tracking
when he was hurt.

Hunt raised these disputed facts in the

trial court. (R. 269, 668). Second, even if Hunt were taking
action to correct excessive tracking, that doesn't defeat his
claim.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury.
v. Blackman, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966).

Hall
Hunt's

theory is that the design defect of no tail pulley guard was
the significant contributing cause of his injury.

This issue

was specifically raised by Hunt in the trial court:
The bend in the conveyor frame issue raised
by ESI is a red herring. The tail pulley
should have had a guard and a kill switch
whether or not a frame was of a web joist
style or was slightly bent in construction.
(R. 270, n. 1) .
It is for the jury to allocate fault and causation.
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985).

4

As stated above, there is one main issue on appeal in
this case: Did the trial court err in concluding that no
material

issues of

fact existed on Hunt's claim that ESI

designed the transfer conveyor which injured him?
main issue on appeal are three subissues:

Within that

1) whether there was

a design defect in the transfer conveyor as designed by ESI;
2) whether there was a substantial alteration in that design;
and

3) whether that design defect was a proximate cause of

Hunt's injury.
these

As stated above in Hunt's initial Brief, all of

issues are

fact questions

for the jury.

Soler v.

Castmaster Division of HPM Corp. 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225
(1984).

ESI acknowledges that the causation issue was raised

in the trial court.

The trial court specifically concluded

that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether a tail
pulley guard would have prevented the injuries suffered by
Hunt.

(R. 762) .

ESI argues, however, that the first two

subissues were not raised in the trial court and cannot now be
raised on appeal.

ESI is wrong.

The first subissue is whether there was a design
defect in the transfer conveyor designed by ESI.

While Hunt

alleged a number of design defects in his complaint, those
defects are limited to one for purposes of this appeal: the
failure to have a tail pulley guard on the transfer conveyor.
5

This issue was raised a number of times in the trial court.
First, the plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint specifically
alleges this design defect. (R. 73-76).

This design defect was

again specifically raised in Hunt's Memorandum in Opposition to
ESI's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.

In

his

opposition

memorandum, Hunt stated:
Gary was hurt on the unguarded tail
pulley of the transfer conveyor. (R. 268) .
. . .The ESI drawing had no guard around
the tail pulley; the transfer conveyor as
built had no guard around the tail pulley.
(R. 267).
The trial court's Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 6 further
evidence that this design defect was raised in the trial court.
Finding of Fact No. 5 states:
Engineering Associates, Inc. an engineering
firm now know by the name of ESI Engineering, Inc. was retained in May of 1982 to
provide engineering design of the salt
washing facilities at the Salt Wash Plant,
including conveyors. (R. 774).
Finding of Fact No. 6 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
ESI Engineering prepared two drawings that
depicted the transfer conveyor. . . .ESI's
drawings of the transfer conveyor also did
not include a tail pulley guard. (R. 774).
Based on these references to the trial court record,
ESI's argument that the design defect issue was not raised in
the trial court is without merit.
6

That issue is properly

before this Court and is an issue for the jury.

Campbell v.

General Motors Corp., 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 649 P.2d 224 (1982).
ESI next argues that the issue of whether there was a
subsequent

substantial

alteration

in

ESI's

design

transfer conveyor was not raised in the trial court.

of

the

This is

an interesting argument because the subsequent alteration of
the transfer conveyor was an issue on which ESI based its
summary judgment motion.
have it both ways.

(R. 593, 596, 606-607).

ESI can't

ESI can't base portions of its motion for

summary judgment on the subsequent alteration of the transfer
conveyor designed by ESI and then argue on appeal that the
subsequent alteration issue was not raised in the trial court.
As more fully explained in his initial Brief, Hunt's
argument on appeal is that any subsequent alteration of the
transfer conveyor was not "substantial" from a liability standpoint and that, even if the alteration is deemed "substantial,"
ESI's negligence in the original design defect of no tail
pulley guard makes ESI liable for Hunt's injury.
This

subsequent

alteration

issue was specifically

raised by Hunt in his Memorandum in Opposition to ESI's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

ESI argued in the trial court that the

1985 change in the transfer conveyor frame from an open web
steel joist frame to a channel iron frame was a substantial
7

alteration in its design, relieving it of liability.
596,

606-607).

In

opposition

to

ESI's

(R. 593,

memorandum,

Hunt

specifically raised the alteration issue, stating:
The tail pulley should have had a guard and
a kill switch whether or not a frame was of
a web joist style or was slightly bent in
construction. (R. 267, n.l).
All issues presented by this appeal were raised in
the trial court and are properly before this Court on appeal.
POINT II
(Replying to Respondent's Point II)
HUNT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CREATE A JURY
QUESTION OF WHETHER ESI DESIGNED THE TRANSFER
CONVEYOR WHICH INJURED HUNT
As set out in Point I of this Reply Brief, the trial
court's Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 6, coupled with Conclusion of
Law No. 12, are sufficient to require the submission of the
issue of ESI's negligent design to a jury.

The trial court

found that ESI was retained to design the transfer conveyor at
the Salt Wash Plant, that ESI prepared drawings setting out
that design, and that ESI's design did not include a tail
pulley

guard.

(R. 774).

The trial court concluded that

material issues of fact exist as to whether a tail pulley guard
would have prevented Hunt's injury.

(R. 762). Although these

findings and conclusions are sufficient to reverse the trial

8

court and remand this case to a jury, Hunt presented additional
evidence to support his position on appeal.
In his Memorandum in Opposition to ESI's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Hunt presented deposition evidence that: 1)
ESI was hired by Lake Point because of ESI's expertise in
conveyor design. (R. 268); 2) Lake Point received, from ESI,
blueprints showing the transfer conveyor design. (R. 268) ; 3)
Lake Point used the ESI blueprint to fabricate the transfer
conveyor. (R. 267-268); 4) that blueprint design had no guard
on the tail pulley. (R. 267); 5) the finished transfer conveyor
had no guard on the tail pulley.

(R 767); and 6) ESI observed

the construction of the transfer conveyor and inspected the
finished product.

(R. 2 67).

This evidence creates additional

factual issues which require remand to the trial court for
determination by a jury.
ESI

Summary judgment was improper.

argues that the cases cited by Hunt

in his

initial Brief are inapplicable and a "red herring" because they
are strict products
cases.

liability rather than negligent design

First of all, that's not true.

Second, even if it were

true, the principles relied upon by Hunt are equally applicable
to strict products liability and negligent design cases.
The cases cited by Hunt in his initial Brief are not
exclusively strict liability cases. McDermott v. Tendun
9

Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690 (1986), relied
upon by Hunt for the proposition that a change in a product is
not "substantial11 unless it is related to the safety of the
product, was an action

"grounded

on claims of negligence,

breach of warranty and strict liability in tort."

Id. at 692.

Much like this case, the plaintiff in McDermott claimed that
an extendable conveyor on which her husband was killed had a
design defect of inadequate guarding devices.

Id. at 697.

Michalko v. Cook Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d
179 (1982) , cited by the court in the Soler decision, was an
action

in which

"the complaint

alleged

negligence, strict

liability and breach of express and implied warranties on the
part of the defendants."

Id. at 182.

States Steamship Company

v. Stone Manganese Marine, 371 F.Supp. 500 (D.C.N.J. 1973),
also

cited

"negligence,

by

the

strict

Soler

court,

liability

in

was

tort,

warranty and breach of express warranty."

a

claim

breach

alleging

of

implied

Id. at 501.

In none

of these cases did the court distinguish its reasoning based on
negligent design and/or strict products liability.
This is consistent with the opinions of courts which
have specifically concluded that the "substantial alteration"
theory

applies

equally

to

strict
10

products

liability

and

negligent design cases.

As recently explained by the Wyoming

Supreme Court:
We agree with
appellee's
general
proposition that material or substantial
alterations of a product after sale may
constitute a defense to all three causes of
action.
Even if a product is defective,
unmerchantable or negligently manufactured,
the seller may not be liable for a
plaintiff's injuries which are caused by
unforeseeable alterations in the product
rather than the original defects.
(Citations omitted).
In the context of
strict liability, this defense has been
explicitly codified in Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A(1)(b) . . . In negligence
and
warranty
claims the material
alterations defense is raised under the
rubric of intervening or superseding cause.
See generally, W. Keeton, Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 102, at 710-712 (1984).
(Emphasis added).
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 345 (Wyo. 1986).
In Bingham v. Godfrey, 114 A.D.2d 987, 495 N.Y.S.2d
428, 429 (1985), the court reached the same conclusion:
A manufacturer of a product may not be cast
in damages either on a strict products
liability or negligence theory, where,
after the product leaves the possession and
control of the manufacturer, there is a
subsequent modification which substantially
alters the product and is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
(Emphasis added).
These cases specifically address the issues on appeal
in

this

case

acknowledge

and
that

support
the

Hunt's

"subsequent
11

position.
substantial

These

cases

alteration"

doctrine applies to negligent design cases.

Whether there was

a "substantial alteration" in ESI's design which would absolve
ESI from liability is a jury question.

Soler v. Castmaster

Division of HPM Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1234 (1984).
The

Ogle

and

Bingham

cases

also

acknowledge

the

exceptions to that defense relied upon by Hunt on appeal.

The

Ogle case acknowledges that the plaintiff's injuries must be
caused by the subsequent alteration, "rather than the original
defect."

Hunt argued in his initial Brief that, despite any

alteration in the transfer conveyor, his injuries were caused
by the original defect in ESI's design: the lack of a tail
pulley guard.
Bingham

(Hunt Appeal Brief, p. 24).

Similarly, the

court stated that the subsequent modification must

substantially alter the product and be the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.

Hunt argues on appeal that the 1985

change in the transfer conveyor frame was not the proximate
cause of his injuries.

The proximate cause of Hunt's injuries

was the failure to have a gucird on the tail pulley, a failure
which was part of ESI's initial design and which existed before
and after the 1985 frame alteration.

(Hunt Appeal Brief, pp.

12-13, 24) .
ESI cites no cases which specifically state that the
principles cited in Hunt's appeal brief have no application to
12

negligent design cases.
specifically

As just shown, courts which have

addressed that

issue hold that the subsequent

alteration principles have equal application to both strict
products liability defective design cases and negligent design
cases.

This is because the essential elements of those causes

of actions are interchangeable.

As stated by the Michigan

Supreme Court:
Like the courts in every state, whether a
suit is based upon negligence or implied
warranty [form of strict liability] we
require the plaintiff to prove that the
product itself is actionable —
that
something is wrong that makes it dangerous.
This idea of "something wrong" is usually
expressed by the adjective "defective" and
the plaintiff must, in every case, in
every jurisdiction, show that the product
was defective.
* * *

In an action against the manufacturer of a
product based upon an alleged defect in its
design, "breach of warranty and negligence
involve identical evidence and require
proof of exactly the same elements."
(Citation omitted). A manufacturer has a
duty to design its product so as to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable
injury.
(Citation omitted). For lack of
reasonable care in the face of such duty,
the manufacturer may be answerable in a
negligence action.
(Citation omitted).
When proceeding under a theory of implied
warranty a design defect is established by
proof that the product is not reasonably
safe for the uses intended, anticipated or
reasonably foreseeable. (Citation omitted).
13

.[I]t is inconceivable that a jury
could determine that the manufacturer had
not breached its duty of reasonable care
and at the same time find that the product
was not reasonably safe for its reasonably
foreseeable uses. The question in either
case turns on reasonable care and reasonable safety, (Emphasis in original).
Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing
N.W.2d 176, 186-87 (1984).

Company, 421 Mich.

670, 3 65

The Prentis Court is not alone in determining that
the

principles

of

negligent

design

and

strict

products

liability for defective design are mutually applicable.

A

manufacturer or designer of a product "is required under both
strict

liability

and

negligence

principles

produce a reasonably safe product."

to

design

and

Anderson v. Dreis and

Krump Manufacturing Corp., 48 Wash. App. 432, 739 P.2d 1177,
1183 (1987).

The difference between a negligent design theory

and a strict liability defective design theory is a limited
one.

As explained by the Arizona Court of Appeals:
Appellant's underlying theories as to both
negligence and strict liability were the
same, to-wit, defective design. . . .In
both instances appellant had to prove that
the tractor was in a defective condition
and unreasonably dangerous. . . .Under the
negligence theory a "defective design"
arises when the manufacturer has failed to
use reasonable care to design its products
so as to make it safe for intended uses.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965).
The difference between the two theories of
liability in a defective design case is
that under strict liability the manufact14

urer can be held liable despite its best
efforts to make or design a safe product.
(Citations omitted).
Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corporation, 23 Ariz. App. 409,
533 P.2d 717, 719 (1975).
Hunt understands that his burden of proof at trial on
a negligent design claim requires proof of fault that may not
be necessary if this were a strict products liability claim.
The substantive legal issues, such as substantial alteration,
however,

apply

equally

to

strict

products

liability

and

negligent design claims.
ESI claims that the "substantial alteration" concept
has no application to negligent design claims.

ESI then cites

negligent design case after negligent design case where product
designers were relieved of liability when their products were
substantially altered after initial design or when the designs
were not followed.
their

position

ESI can't embrace the concept when it helps

and

then

turn

around

and

condemn

it

as

inapplicable when it hurts their position.
In the last section of its Brief, ESI recites case
after case to support the proposition that a design engineer
is

not

liable

when

its

designs

are

not

followed

"in an

important particular and damages result which may have been due
to the departure."
after).

(ESI Brief, p. 36 and cases cited there-

Hunt doesn't disagree with the legal principles set
15

out

those

cases

because

they

support Hunt's position. To

relieve the design engineer from liability, any departure in
the design must be "in an important particular" and the damages
must be due to the departure.

Am. Jur. Architects § 23 (1962).

The departure must be "so far material that it may have been
the direct cause of the injury."

Lake v. McElfatrick, 139 N.Y.

349, 34 N.E. 922, 925 (1893).

A design engineer cannot be

liable for negligent design where "there is no evidence that
the defects were not due to the departure from the plans."
Dorsev v. Frishman, 291 F.Supp. 794, 796 (D. D.C. 1968).
Each of these cases cited by ESI supports Hunt's
theory in this case.

Hunt argues that the 1985 alteration in

the frame of the transfer conveyor was not "in an important
particular" from a liability and safety standpoint, nor was it
"so far material that it may have been the direct cause of the
injury."

Hunt argues that the direct cause of the injury was

ESI's failure to initially design the transfer conveyor with a
tail pulley guard.

Unlike the Dorsey case, here there is

evidence that the defects were due to the initial design; not
to the subsequent alteration.
ESI
appeal

somewhat

in this case.

mischaracterizes

the

main

issue

on

It is not whether ESI's plans and

specifications were followed.

While that issue is part of the
16

law underlying this appeal, that is not the main issue on
appeal.

The main issue on appeal is whether ESI designed the

transfer conveyor which injured Hunt.
evidence presented

In addition to the

in the trial court regarding how ESI's

design was followed (see record references p. 9 of this Reply
Brief), Hunt stated in the trial court:
Even if Lake Point failed to follow the
blueprint in every other respect, it
followed ESI's design in the most important
respect, the failure to include a guard
around the tail pulley. (R. 267).
The issue on appeal here, the trial court's conclusion
that

"plaintiff

was

not

injured

by

the transfer

conveyor

designed by ESI," was specifically based on the following:
Lake Point originally constructed the
transfer conveyor with the frame designed
by ESI, the frame was changed when the
transfer conveyor was reconstructed in 1985
with a channel iron frame. . . . (R. 766).
The issue on appeal in this case is based on the
"subsequent alteration" of the frame of the transfer conveyor
in 1985, not on Lake Point's failure to follow ESI's plans or
specifications in the original construction of the transfer
conveyor in 1982-83.
The question, to be decided by the jury, is whether
that

alteration

in

ESI's

design was

"substantial" from a

liability standpoint and even if it was, whether the original
17

design

defect

of

no

tail

pulley

guard

was

concurrent proximate cause of Hunt's injury.
questions.

the

sole

or

These are jury

McDermott v. Tendun Contractors, 511 A. 2d 690

(N.J.Super. 1986); Soler v. Castmaster Division of HPM Corp.,
98 N.J.

137, 484 A.2d

1225

(1984).

ESI

can present no

convincing argument why these principles do not apply to a
negligent design clciim.

As evidenced by the cases cited in

this Reply Brief, they do.

All cases cited and arguments made

by Hunt in his initial Brief apply to this claim and the issues
presented on appeal.
CONCLUSION
All issues presented on appeal were raised in the
trial court.

Hunt presented ample evidence to the trial court

to create a jury question of whether ESI designed the transfer
conveyor which injured Hunt.
was improper.

Summary Judgment on that issue

This case should be remanded to the trial court

for a jury to decide that issue.
DATED this

M

day of September, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant

By:
GLEN A. COOK
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